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as the conservative central banker and optimal inflation contracts. Our theoretical model also shows
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of shocks to the economy.
Frederic S. Mishkin
Graduate School of Business
Uris Hall 817
Columbia University











  With the development of the literature on the time-inconsistency problem in Kydland 
and Prescott (1977), Calvo (1978) and Barro and Gordon (1983), there has been an 
increasing recognition both by policymakers and the academic literature that solving the 
time-inconsistency problem is crucial to the successful conduct of monetary policy.  The 
time-inconsistency problem arises because there are incentives for the monetary policymaker 
to try to exploit the short-run tradeoff between employment and inflation to pursue short-run 
employment objectives using expansionary monetary policy, although the result is poor long-
run outcomes – higher inflation, with no benefit on the output front. 
Two approaches have been suggested in the literature to cope with the time-
inconsistency problem: appointment of a conservative central banker (Rogoff, 1985) or 
adoption of optimal contracts for monetary policymakers (Walsh, 1995).  Although both 
these approaches have attractive theoretical properties, they are difficult to implement in 
practice.  It is likely to be quite difficult to find a central banker with the “right” preferences 
and it is hard to believe that politicians would naturally want to appoint central bankers with 
different preferences than theirs.  Also, an opportunistic government would also be unlikely 
to appoint a conservative central banker, so that a regime based on having a conservative 
central banker is unlikely to be stable over time. 
Optimal inflation contracts, usually thought of as pecuniary contracts between the 
government and the monetary authorities, are also unattractive because central bankers are 
not paid very highly, and this is particularly true in the United States, where the chairman of 
the Board of Governors is paid far less than many economics professors.  Thus, it is highly 
unlikely that governments would be willing to write an inflation contract that would give a 
central banker sufficient incentives to produce optimal policy. Furthermore, public officials 
are almost never paid on the basis of their performance and we know of no central banker 
anywhere in the world that has performance-based pay.   It also seems politically untenable 
to write an explicit inflation contract in which the central bank is rewarded for undershooting 
the optimal inflation rate.
1 Finally, in order for the inflation contract to be optimal it requires 
                                                 
1  Svensson (1997) also points out that if a low inflation level is associated with high unemployment, then an 
inflation contract may be politically difficult to implement since it rewards a central banker when inflation is 
low.   4
that we know how much the central banker values his office and that the monetary costs 
inflicted on the central baker would have to be translatable into utility units.  This feature 
seems unappealing from a practical standpoint. 
This paper argues that inflation band targeting, in which the central bank is assigned a 
target range and bears some cost if inflation goes outside the range, presents an alternative 
and more feasible approach to address the time-inconsistency problem. Indeed, inflation band 
targeting has already been adopted by many central banks. For example, the Reserve Bank of 
New Zealand is required to keep inflation within the range of 1-3% and in case of failure the 
Governor is subject to dismissal. Bank of England has a target range of plus/minus one 
percent around a 2% inflation target, and if it fails the Governor is required to write a public 
letter to the government explaining why. We show that inflation band targeting regimes 
belong to a specific subclass of inflation contracts characterized by a particularly simple 
form, making them easy to adopt.
2  In fact, we are not arguing against the feasibility of 
inflation contracts in general, but rather the infeasibility of an optimal inflation contract as 
discussed above. 
Note that our model only focuses on how inflation targeting can effectively deal with 
distortions arising from the time-inconsistency problem.
3 This, however, is only one aspect 
of inflation targeting and does not exclude additional benefits such as better management of 
expectations through improved communication and policy transparency, nor does it preclude 
a view of inflation targeting as a commitment mechanism to optimal policy inertia as 
emphasized by Giannoni and Woodford (2003).
  
Inflation band targeting has several advantages relative to either appointment of a 
conservative central banker or optimal inflation contracts.  First it eliminates the problem of 
finding the perfect central banker with the right preferences.  Second, the framework is likely 
to be stable over time once the government has agreed to it.  Third the target range provides 
added flexibility to the inflation targeting regime that is more palatable to politicians.  Fourth, 
it is a simple framework that is easily implemented, and in contrast to optimal inflation 
contracts it does not require knowledge of how much the central banker values his office. 
                                                 
2 Inflation band targeting regimes are also closely related to a dismissal rule as discussed by Walsh (2002). 
3 We do not address the stabilization bias that the time-inconsistency problem gives rise to in a New Keynesian 
framework (e.g Clarida et al, 1999). Instead our analysis focuses on the case where the objectives of the central 
bank deviate from what is socially optimal due to political pressure.   5
Although inflation band targeting has these attractive features, to our knowledge there 
is no research that provides a theoretical treatment of how inflation target bands can be 
designed to mitigate the time-inconsistency problem.
4  It is not clear that inflation band 
targeting has desirable properties.  Indeed, some economists, including one of the authors of 
this paper, have been skeptical of inflation band targeting because it might produce too much 
focus on the edges of the range that can lead to the central bank to concentrate too much on 
keeping the inflation rate just within the range, rather than hitting the midpoint of the range 
(Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin and Posen, 1999, and Mishkin, 2001).   
In this paper we analyze how inflation target ranges work in the context of a Barro-
Gordon (1983) type model, but which has a more realistic setting in that the time-
inconsistency problem stems not from the preferences of the central bank, as in Barro-
Gordon, but instead from political pressures from the government.  We demonstrate that 
inflation target bands or a range can achieve many of the benefits of these other strategies, 
providing a possible reason why this strategy has been used by so many central banks.  Our 
theoretical model also enables us to outline how an inflation targeting range should be 
designed optimally and how it should change when there are changes in the nature of shocks 
to the economy.  
To analyze the properties of inflation band targeting, we first examine a canonical 
benchmark model of optimal monetary policy and then illustrate the time-inconsistency 
problem which derives from discretionary monetary policy when the preferences of the 
government differs from those of the central bank.  We then demonstrate what the optimal 
inflation contract would look like, and then develop the theory of inflation band targeting, 
showing how it replicates many of the features of the optimal inflation contract.   
 
 
                                                 
4 Amano, Black and Kasumovich (1997) examines whether the literature on exchange rate target zones can be 
applied to inflation band targeting. Erceg (2002) interpret the target range as a confidence interval of inflation 
derived from the preferences of the policymakers. The optimal bandwidth should then be chosen to reflect the 
desired point on the trade-off locus between inflation and unemployment volatility. Orphanides and Wieland 
(2000) recognise that inflation band targeting implies non-linear monetary policy and show that such policy is 
optimal when preferences are zone-quadratic or the structure of the economy exhibits zone linearity. Neither of 
these papers, however, consider inflation band targeting as a solution to the time-inconsistency problem. Athey, 
Atkeson, and Kehoe (2005) consider the Barro-Gordon set up when the central bank has private information 
about the state of the economy. Discretion allows the central bank to react to this information but it also gives 
rise to a desire to over-stimulate the economy. Thus the public has to decide the degree of discretion is should 
give the central bank. The authors show that an inflation cap can implement the optimal solution.   6
2. A Canonical Benchmark Model of Optimal Monetary Policy  
 
The structure of the economy is deliberately kept parsimonious in order to bring the intuition 
of our result to the forefront. The aggregate supply relationship is described by the simple 
expectation-augmented Phillips curve, 
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where,
n u is the natural rate,  t u is the realized unemployment rate in period t,  t ε is an i.i.d 
supply shock with mean 0 and fixed variance 
2
ε σ , and b is a positive constant. The realized 
inflation and expected inflation in period t are denoted by  t π  and 
e
t π , respectively. It is 
worth commenting on the fact that equation (1) differs from recent specifications of the New 
Keynesian Phillips curve (e.g., Clarida, Gali and Gertler,1999) in two important aspects. 
First, expectations are set over current inflation and not over future inflation as is the case 
under staggered price/wage setting. Second, the supply shock or cost-push shock,  t ε , does 
not exhibit persistence. These two assumptions simplify the framework considerably and 
allows us to gain a simple and attractive intuition on how inflation band targeting might 
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where  1 − t E  refers to rational expectations formed with the complete information set up until 
and including period t-1. The central bank sets the inflation rate directly, but does not have 
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where  t z  is a normally distributed control error with mean 0 and a fixed variance 
2
z σ . 
Additionally, the central bank determines the inflation rate after observing the public’s   7
expectations and the supply shock. Consequently, since the supply shock is not included in 
the public’s information set at t-1, the central bank can mitigate supply shock effects on real 
activity by creating surprise inflation. 
Following a large literature we assume that the social welfare function at time t is 
specified over the inflation and unemployment rate in the following manner, 
 




t u t t u u W − + − − = ω π π ωπ      (3) 
 
where  π ω is the weight on inflation volatility around its socially optimal level 
* π , and  u ω is 
the weight on unemployment volatility around its natural level.
5 
Now suppose that the monetary authorities could credibly commit to a state-
contingent rule of the inflation rate. The optimal rule can then be derived by maximizing the 
sum of current and future discounted welfare levels subject to the Phillips curve and rational 














t W E Max
t
β
π   subject  to  equations (1) and (2)    
   
Since there are no endogenous state variables, the maximization problem collapses to a one 





















*        ( 4 )  
 
Equation (4) indicates that it is optimal to set the inflation rate equal to the social optimal 
level of inflation and to respond to shocks that forces the current level of unemployment 
away from its long-run level. The shock management depends crucially on the preference 
parameters,  u ω  and  π ω . The higher the relative weight is on unemployment stability the 
                                                 
5 See Reis (2004) for a formal derivation of the Phillips-curve and the welfare function (3) based on a general 
equilibrium framework.   8
more volatile is inflation.
6 Combining (1) and (4), we can derive the equilibrium 
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According to (4) and (5), average inflation and unemployment are equal to their target 
values. By substitution (4) and (5) into the welfare function we can obtain the unconditional 
expected welfare level in equilibrium as: 
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Since equations (4)-(8) represents optimal monetary policy, we will use this case as a 
benchmark in the analysis that follows. Any deviation from the optimal inflation rule 
described in equation (4) must hence lead to a decline in welfare.  
 
3. Monetary Policy Under Discretion When Objectives of the Government and the 
Monetary Authorities Differ 
 
One undesirable feature of the Barro-Gordon (1983) model, first raised by McCallum (1995) 
and elaborated on by Mishkin (2000), is that the time-inconsistency problem by itself does 
not imply that a central bank will pursue expansionary monetary policy which leads to 
inflation.  Simply by recognizing the problem that forward-looking expectations in the wage- 
                                                 
6 Under the New Keynesian Phillips Curve where expectations are forward-looking, the optimal rule would 
display inertia. That is, optimal policy would, as labeled by Woodford (2003), be history dependent.    9
and price-setting process creates for a strategy of pursuing expansionary monetary policy, 
monetary policymakers can decide to “just not do it” and avoid the time-inconsistency 
problem altogether.
7   Indeed, central bankers are fully aware of the time-inconsistency 
problem, but the time-inconsistency problem remains nonetheless because politicians are 
able to put pressure on central banks to pursue overly expansionary monetary policy. 
  In this paper, we modify the Barro-Gordon (1983) model for two reasons:  First it 
produces a more realistic setting in which the central bank is unable to pursue optimal 
monetary policy because the government may be motivated, for political reasons, to 
maximize a different welfare function than (3) under discretion.  Although we find our 
modification theoretically attractive, the results on the benefits of inflation band targeting 
would not differ if we instead used a Barro-Gordon approach in which the time-inconsistency 
problem occurs because of the preferences of the central bank.  The second reason for 
modifying the Barro-Gordon model is more substantive.  By modifying the Barro-Gordon 
model, we obtain an additional dimension that affects the design of an inflation targeting 
regime, the degree to which the central bank can be insulated from political pressures. 
In particular we assume that the relevant utility function for the government can be 
described as follows, 
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g
t − + + − − = δ ω π π ωπ      (9) 
 
If  0 > δ , the government gains some extra utility from lowering unemployment volatility 
and if 
n u u <
* the government also gets some extra utility from lowering the unemployment 
level below its natural level. We argue that the reason for the government’s utility function to 
differ from the social welfare function is that lower unemployment (output) volatility and 
lower unemployment both increase the probability of reelection. Hence the government has 
two objectives; (1) maximize the public’s welfare level and (2) increase the probability of 
being reelected. These objectives are not always aligned. For example, the government may 
                                                 
7 In the typical Barro-Gordon framework the monetary authorities are assumed to have an overly optimistic 
unemployment target (i.e., a target below the natural rate), which produces a desire to exploit the short-run trade 
off between inflation and employment and hence an on average higher then optimal inflation rate in 
equilibrium. As Blinder (1997) points out, the monetary authorities could simply chose to target the natural rate 
and thereby avoid the time-inconsistency problem.   10
prefer a more stable and low unemployment rate in order to signal to potential voters that it is 
more competent than its political rivals.
8 As Persson and Tabellini (2000) points out, this 
behavior is rational if agents cannot contemporaneously observe the inflationary effects of 
expansionary monetary policy, which is likely since inflation typically lags economic 
activity.  
The preferences of the monetary authorities on the other hand are assumed to mirror 
the social welfare function. This is because we believe that they are better modeled as 
technocrats who understand that they cannot gain utility from being overly expansionary. 
However, if the central bank is not fully independent, the government is likely to have some 
influence over monetary policy. To incorporate this notion we assume that the monetary 
authorities are maximizing the following objective function at time t, 
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where  1 0 ≤ ≤ λ , and reflects the degree to which the monetary authorities care about the 
government’s utility level.
9  The parameterλ  could thus be thought of as the degree of 
political influence over monetary policy.
10 It can be shown that equation (10), in its reduced 
form, is equivalent to the objective function in the typical Barro-Gordon setting, but has the 
added advantage of recovering structural parameters essential to our analysis..  
Clearly, it would be socially optimal if the monetary authorities could credibly 
commit to the inflation rule described by equation (4). However, as Kydland and Prescott 
(1977) argue, no such commitment exists when policy is discretionary in nature. 
Consequently, the monetary authorities, knowing that the public is aware that they are unable 
to resist the political influence from the government, do not believe that they can credibly 
                                                 
8 See Persson and Tabellini (2000) for a survey of this literature. Fair (1978) presents empirical evidence that 
the incumbent government is more likely to be reelected in periods of high economic growth.  
9 Cukierman (1992) also models central bank independence. He considers two possibilities: (i)  the government 
and the central bank has the same objective function but the politicians have a lower discount factorβ than  the 
central bank (ii) the government has a greater desire than the central bank to create surprise inflation. He then 
measures the degree of central bank independence as the weighted average of the government’s and the central 
bank’s objective functions.   
10 In our model λ  is exogenously determined. However, it is quite possible that λ  would be positively related 
to 
* u u
n −  andδ . That is, the greater the preference misalignment between the government and the central 
bank, the more influence the government tries to exert over the central bank. 
   11
manipulate inflation expectations. That is, they take inflation expectations as given when 
maximizing 
cb
t U . The optimization problem facing the monetary authorities under discretion 
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i t+ π , for all i are taken as given. Since there are no endogenous state variables the 
maximization problem collapses into a one period specification. The first order condition 
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Equation (11) suggests that, under discretion, the monetary authorities have three concerns 
when determining  t π . The first is to set inflation as close as possible to the social optimal 
level of inflation, 
* π , i.e., the long-run inflation target. The second concern is to appease the 
pressure from the government by raising the inflation rate above its long-run target in order 
to push the unemployment rate closer to 
* u . As equation (11) shows, if the unemployment 
target of the government coincides with that of the central bank, the pressure on the central 
bank to inflate the economy disappears. The third concern of the monetary authorities is to 
stabilize unemployment around its natural rate. By adjusting the inflation rate the monetary 
authorities can mitigate the effect of a supply shock on real activity. Notice that the response 
to a supply shock is increasing in δ . The higher δ  is, the greater is the pressure from the 
government on the central bank to stabilize real activity relative to inflation.  
Let us solve for the long-run equilibrium levels of the inflation and unemployment 
under discretion. The private sector forms its expectations rationally but cannot observe the 
supply shock, t ε . Taking the expectations of (11) using equation (1) we get the following 
expressions for the equilibrium inflation and unemployment rate: 
   12
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Equation (12a) and (12b) tell us several interesting facts regarding the determinants of the 
level and volatility of equilibrium inflation and unemployment. First, the expected long-run 
unemployment rate is simply equal to the natural rate. Secondly, expected long-run inflation 
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This inflation bias arises in our model because the central bank is not fully independent. That 
is, the monetary authorities will on average be pressured by the government to inflate the 
economy. The central bank will raise inflation until the marginal cost of pushing inflation 
above its socially optimal rate equals the perceived marginal benefits from giving in to 
political pressure. However, since the public behaves rationally it will expect a higher level 
of inflation and hence there is no impact on real activity on average. Figure 1 illustrates this 
result assuming that 
* π = 2%. Inflation expectations and inflation are measured on the x-axis 
and the y-axis, respectively. The dotted 45-degree line represents all the feasible equilibrium 
points. The solid line represents the central banks optimal inflation level given the public’s 
inflation expectations under discretion (assuming that the supply shock is zero). The 
intersection of these two schedules represents the steady state level of inflation.  The figure 
indicates an equilibrium inflation of approximately 2.8% and thus a bias of 0.8%. 
From (12a) and (12b) we can derive the long-run inflation and unemployment 
volatility under discretion as:  
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When comparing equations (14a) and (14b) with equations (7) and (8), we see that if  0 > λδ , 
then inflation (unemployment) volatility is excessively high (low) under discretion. The 
excess inflation volatility is negatively related to the degree of central bank independence 
and positively related to how much the government cares about stabilizing real activity 
relative to the central bank. Figure 2 shows the central bank’s optimal inflation rate (y-axis) 
given the level of the supply shock (x-axis). The dashed line represents the optimal rule 
derived in section 2 and the solid line represents the supply shock management under 
discretion. Note that the slope of the reaction function is flatter under the optimal rule; hence 
there is excess inflation volatility under discretion.
11 
Another interesting result is that our simple model predicts that the level of inflation 
is positively correlated with the volatility of inflation through the stabilization bias 
parameter,δ . Svensson (1997) derives a similar prediction by introducing employment 
persistence. In his model, the persistence insures that surprise inflation has a positive effect 
on employment in the future and thus provides an additional incentive for the policymakers 
to both be overly expansionary and react stronger to supply shocks. In equilibrium this 
causes a larger inflation bias and more volatile inflation than in the absence of employment 
persistence. In contrast, the positive relationship between the level and volatility of inflation 
in our model stems entirely from the government’s desire to push unemployment volatility 
below its socially optimal level.  
                                                 
11 Svensson (1997) also finds inflation volatility too high under discretion. However, the source of the distortion 
stems from persistence in employment. If supply shocks have a persistent effect on employment, then there is 
an extra incentive for the monetary authorities to mitigate the effect of the supply shock on real activity. 
Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999) examine discretionary monetary policy in a New Keynesian framework and 
find that persistence in the cost-push shock leads to excess inflation volatility. This, however, is due to the 
forward looking behavior of price setters in the economy which is absent in our and Svensson’s (1997) models.   14
Given equations (13) and (14), the unconditional expected welfare level in 
equilibrium can be expressed as: 
 
[] () [] ) ( ) (
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Comparing (15) to (6) we can identify three determinants of the welfare distortions under 
discretion:  
 
(i)   The government’s unemployment target, 
* u : Given the level of independence, the more 
misaligned the government’s unemployment target is with the natural level, the higher 
is the long-run inflation bias and the lower is welfare. 
 
(ii)  The government’s stabilization bias,δ :  Given the level of independence, the 
government’s excessive weight on unemployment stability has two negative effects on 
overall welfare. First, the more misaligned the government is with the monetary 
authorities regarding the stabilization objective the smaller is the unemployment 
volatility and hence the greater is inflation volatility. Second, the inflation bias is 
positively related toδ . This stems from the cost structure of the welfare function. The 
higher δ  is, the higher is the perceived cost by the government of any given difference 
between the natural rate and the government’s unemployment target and the more 
pressure it will lever on the monetary authorities to be overly expansionary 
 
(iii)  Degree of political influence: Since incomplete central bank independence allows the 
government to affect monetary policy decisions, the degree of political influence affects 
both the inflation bias and inflation volatility. That is, an increase in political influence 
causes a rise in the average level and volatility of inflation. This positive relationship is 
consistent with empirical evidence (see Alesina and Summers (1993) and Franzese 
(1998)).  
 
   15
3.1 Complete Independence under Discretion 
 
The previous section suggests that a simple way of reducing the excess inflation level and 
volatility is to decrease the influence that the government has over monetary policy i.e., 
lowering λ . It is instructive to consider the situation when the central bank is completely 
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The expression shows that the monetary authorities no longer have a desire to on average 
push inflation above its social optimal level. Additionally, the stabilization bias is not present 
anymore. In a sense the technocrats are now left alone to conduct monetary policy.  Taking 
the expectation of (16) and using equation (1), it is clear that equilibrium inflation and 
unemployment are now equal to equation (4) and (5), respectively. Hence if the central bank 
is completely independent, then it does not matter whether monetary policy is discretionary 
in nature or simply follows a pre-specified rule. The optimal inflation path will be 
implemented. This result arises because the public is aware that, although monetary policy is 
discretionary, there exists no incentive for the monetary authorities to systematically exploit 
the short-run relation between unemployment and inflation. Hence, no commitment is 
necessary. As Svensson (1997) and Blinder (1997) point out, if the monetary authorities 
simply target the natural rate of unemployment the time-inconsistency problem disappears. 
They argue that this is exactly what central banks do today. Our framework is consistent with 
this view, but only if the monetary authorities can operate without pressure from the 
government.  
It is worth noting that in the typical New Keynesian framework in which future 
expected future inflation appears as an argument in the Phillips curve, complete 
independence would not be enough to ensure that optimal monetary policy is implemented 
under discretion. As Clarida et al (1999) show, in that case discretionary monetary policy 
would still lead to a stabilization bias even if the central bank maximized the correct welfare   16
function. By using a standard neoclassical Phillips curve in which current, not future, 
expected inflation is an argument in the Phillips cure, we can avoid this aspect of optimal 
policy and concentrate on the distortions that arise due to political pressure. Thus, in our 
setting, it will be convenient to view equation (16), as the optimal reaction function under 
discretion.  
 
4. Optimal Inflation Contracts 
 
In order to understand the relationship between inflation band targeting and optimal inflation 
contracts, we need to examine the approach to reduce the welfare distortions under discretion 
suggested by Walsh (1995) and Persson and Tabellini (1993).  The idea is to write a contract 
between the government and the monetary authorities which penalizes the monetary 
authorities if they deviate from the optimal level of inflation. At first it might appear bizarre 
for the government to agree upon a contract that will limit their ability to influence monetary 
policy. The point is, however, that the contract is written before expectations are determined 
and thus before the government is faced with the temptation to exploit the short-run trade-off 
between inflation and unemployment.  Realizing its inability to refrain from this temptation 
once it arises, the government is willing to tie its hands by accepting the contract. 
  Most of the literature considers linear contracts that inflict a constant marginal 
penalty on the central bank when it raises inflation above its optimal level. As Svensson 
(1997) shows, these contracts are equivalent to the case of appointment of a target-
conservative central banker.
12  We will now show that a quadratic inflation contract can 
eliminate both the inflation bias and the excess volatility in our model. Additionally, this 
quadratic inflation contract is equivalent to the combination of a target-conservative and 
weight-conservative that we describe in appendix A.  
Define the quadratic inflation contract as an added penalty structure to the central 
banks objective function 
cb
t U  defined by equation (10) i.e., 
 
                                                 
12 We refer to a target-conservative central banker as one that has an inflation target lower than the optimal rate. 
Svensson (1997) does not use the term “target-conservative central banker.” Instead, he refers to this set-up as a 
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The first linear term of the contract inflicts a positive constant marginal cost on the monetary 
authorities when inflation is raised above the socially optimal level and thus can undo the 
inflation bias. The second quadratic term of the contract inflicts an increasing marginal cost 
and will hence discourage the monetary authorities from reacting too strongly to supply 
shocks and thus can undo the stabilization bias. The first order condition of the maximization 
problem can be expressed as: 
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The second term of expression (18) is the marginal cost that the quadratic contract inflicts on 
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Clearly the optimal parameters of the inflation contract must transform (19) into (16). This is 
true under the following parameterization:  
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Figure 3 shows the relationship between the marginal cost imposed by the optimal inflation 
contract on the monetary authorities for different levels of inflation (see the dashed line). As 
indicated by expression (18) the marginal cost is positive at the optimal inflation level and 
increases linearly as inflation rises. In the appendix we show that this solution is indeed 
equivalent to the optimal conservative central banker.  
   18
5.  Modeling Inflation Band Targeting   
 
Inflation band targeting regimes can be seen as a subset of the class of inflation contracts. 
The government and the monetary authorities agree upon an inflation range within which 
inflation must be kept, and if the central bank fails to contain inflation within the specified 
range some form of punishment is inflicted on the monetary authorities. There are two main 
components of inflation band targeting; (1) the specified range and (2) the degree of 
accountability. Let us denote the upper and lower boundaries of the target range by π  and 
π , respectively, and the cost of overshooting (undershooting) the range by C .
13 Because the 
monetary authorities cannot perfectly control inflation there will always be a positive 
probability of failing to hit the target range. The new objective function facing the central 
bank at time t can thus be written as: 
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t U  is defined by (10) ,  ) (• F  is the cumulative distribution function of the control 
error  t z ,   BW + =
* π π , and  BW − =
* π π . For example, an inflation band target of 1-3% 
can be described by  2
* = π  and a bandwidth of  1 = BW . The F.O.C can be derived as: 
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The first term of expression (21) corresponds to the F.O.C under discretion. The second term 
is the marginal cost of missing the target range. Comparing (18) and (21) we can see how 
similar the set-up is to an inflation contract. The difference is simply the functional form of 
the marginal cost structure.  
                                                 
13 The framework suggests that the edges of the target range are “hard” in the sense that there is a zero tolerance 
of missing the range.  Svensson (2001) on the other hand has argued for “soft” edges in order to avoid 
unnecessary instability in output, and interest rates.   Although there might be advantages to “soft” edges, our 
results indicate that “hard” edges do quite well in getting close to the optimal contract and much better than we 
thought.     19
  In fact, equation (21) suggests that the set of contracts involving inflation band 
targeting could be broadened further. For example, we could allow for an asymmetric 
accountability structure, greater penalties for larger deviations from the target, a midpoint 
that differs from the social optimal level, or simply defining an upper boundary but not a 
lower one, a so-called inflation cap. It is clear that such generalizations of the framework 
would allow us to find an optimal design that could move us even closer to optimum than the 
set-up that we consider here. However there are several reasons why we are not taking this 
direction. First, in many inflation band targeting regimes the main cost of missing the target 
range is the embarrassment effect and there is little reason for this cost to be asymmetric. 
Additionally, from a practical point of view, it is inherently difficult to set the right level of 
accountability in the first place, and it would be even harder to specify the correct difference 
between levels of accountability assigned to the lower and upper boundary. Second, setting a 
midpoint lower than the optimal inflation level may be politically infeasible. Indeed, the 
more opportunistic the government is the lower the midpoint has to be in order to offset the 
increased inflation bias. For the same reasons we objected to optimal inflation contracts in 
which the central bank is rewarded for undershooting the optimal inflation rate, we believe 
that setting a midpoint below the social optimal inflation rate is politically untenable.  We 
believe there is little incentive for a government to agree to such an arrangement. Third, as 
Eggertson (2004) shows, discretionary policy could under certain circumstances give rise to a 
reversed inflation bias i.e., a deflation bias. In that case an inflation floor would be needed 
and just having an inflation cap would not make much sense. Furthermore, central banks 
particularly dislike deflation and the zero inflation level may thus provide an unavoidable 
lower boundary.
14  
  Because we assume that the control error is normally distributed there is no closed 
form solution for the reaction function of the central bank. Consequently, in the proceeding 
analysis we rely upon simulations in order to understand the effects that the inflation range 
has on the long-run inflation level and volatility. 
15 The parameter values chosen for the 
                                                 
14 For example, Switzerland only specifies an upper boundary of 2%, but has made it clear that they would not 
accept deflation. 
15 The first order condition is derived under the assumption of i.i.d supply shocks. We do this to make our 
analysis of the inflation band target more tractable. One way in which previous literature has incorporated 
persistence in the unemployment rate is by including a lagged unemployment rate in the Phillips curve (e.g., 
Svensson (1997)). This would not change our result substantially as long as inflation stays within the target   20
simulation exercises are based on U.S. annual inflation and unemployment data. The slope of 
the Philips curve, b, is equal to 0.64 as suggested by Reis (2004). The standard deviations of 
the control error and supply shock are set at 0.6 and 1, respectively.
16 The natural rate is 
assumed to be 4% and the optimal level of inflation is set at 2%.
17 The preference parameters 
of the social welfare function and the degree of political influence are obviously chosen in a 
more ad hoc manner. We assume that unemployment and inflation stabilization are given 
equal importance (i.e., u ω ωπ = = 1) and that the degree of independence is 0.5.
 18 The latter 
implies that the central bank puts an equal weight on the utility of the government and the 
social welfare level. We further assume that the government has an unemployment target of 
3.5% ( i.e.,   % 5 . 0
* = −u u
n ) and cares 5 times as much about controlling unemployment 
versus inflation volatility (i.e.,δ = 4). Obviously these numbers are not based on any 
empirical estimates, but they do not seem too unrealistic. The annual inflation bias amounts 
to approximately 0.8. 
 
5.1 The Marginal Cost Structure 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
range. However, if the supply shock is large, the persistence in unemployment would cause inflation to be 
outside the range for several periods. In this case the central bank would pay the cost (C) every period until 
inflation converges within the target range. In reality, this repeated violation may cause the public to doubt the 
commitment by the central bank. Consequently, it may be optimal for the central bank to specify a state 
contingent inflation target range as long as inflation is outside the original target band. Indeed, this is exactly 
what occurred in 2003 in Brazil. Alternatively, if a country is adopting an inflation band targeting regime while 
inflation is well above its long-run target, such as in Canada and Chile, then it may be optimal to start with a 
appropriately specified midpoint target and then continuously adjust it until it converges to the desired long-run 
rate.  
16 Using survey data on inflation expectations since 1978 (provided by the University of Michigan’s Research 
Survey Center) and the implicit GDP deflator we estimate the volatility of the control error to be approximately 
0.6. Our estimate for the volatility of the supply shock is approximately consistent with Hodrick-Prescott 
filtered annual average unemployment data since 1970. 
17 The value of the natural rate is probably a low estimate for the U.S. However, the level of the natural rate is 
not important in our simulations. It is the difference between the government’s unemployment target and the 
natural rate that is relevant. The optimal inflation rate of 2% is chosen because several existing inflation 
targeting regimes centers the target range on this level. 
18 The equal weights could be viewed as a reflection of the dual mandate that the Federal Reserve is working 
under. Other central banks such as the European Central Bank has a hierarchical mandate where price stability 
is its foremost objective, perhaps indicating a lower weight on unemployment volatility relative to inflation 
volatility.  The measure of political influence is consistent with Cukierman’s (1992) estimate of the legal 
independence of the Fed during the 80s. Cukierman’s index ranges from zero (minimal independence) to one 
(maximium independence). He estimates the overall legal independence of the Fed to be 0.51.   21
The key to inflation band targeting is to understand how the marginal cost structure affects 
monetary policy under discretion. Figure 3 shows the marginal cost structure for inflation 
band targeting as a function of the inflation level, assuming a normally distributed control 
error.  The solid line represents the marginal cost under inflation band targeting while the 
dashed line the marginal cost of the optimal inflation contract.  The bandwidth is set at 1.2% 
and that accountability level at 3.
19 There are several characteristics of the marginal cost 
structure under inflation band targeting worth pointing out: 
 
(i)   Symmetric around the midpoint: The marginal cost is symmetric around the midpoint 
of the target range. Since the band is centered around the social optimal level of 
inflation, the cost of over and undershooting the target range is the same. Hence the 
marginal cost must be zero at the midpoint. If the inflation rate is above (below) the 
midpoint, the marginal cost is positive (negative) and encourages the monetary 
authorities to lower (raise) inflation. Consequently, inflation band targeting reduces 
the incentives of the monetary authorities to give in to political pressure and over-
stabilize real activity. Additionally, since the marginal cost of increasing inflation 
above its socially optimal level is relatively higher than under discretion, the inflation 
bias must be lower. However, because the marginal cost is zero at the midpoint it is 
impossible to completely eliminate the inflation bias. Notice that this is in contrast to 
the inflation contract which allows for a positive marginal cost at the socially optimal 
level of inflation and can therefore completely eliminate the inflation bias. 
 
(ii)   Increasing marginal cost inside the range: The marginal cost of missing the target 
range increases as inflation moves away from the midpoint and towards the edges of 
the range. It peaks approximately at the boundaries.
 20 Hence, similar to the optimal 
inflation contract, the slope of the marginal cost structure is positive within the target 
                                                 
19 These values were chosen to provide the clearest picture of the marginal cost structure under inflation 
targeting regime. As Table 1(b) shows, the optimal design corresponds to a bandwidth of 1.2% and a level of 
accountability of 5. 
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Hence the maximum marginal cost occurs outside the boundaries of the target range. However, as  σ / BW  
becomes large the maximum marginal cost approaches the boundary .    22
range. However, in contrast to the optimal inflation contract, the normality of the 
error term makes the marginal cost non-linear and therefore prevents the regime from 




(iii)   Decreasing marginal cost outside the range: As inflation goes beyond the bandwidth 
the absolute value of the marginal cost decreases.
22 The diminishing marginal cost 
outside the range is due to the probability distribution of the control error. The further 
away the optimal inflation rate is from the edges of the target range the less likely it is 
for the realized inflation to fall within the target range. That is, the marginal cost of 
exiting the target range is close to zero when inflation is well outside the target range 
and will therefore have no impact on monetary policy. For example, if the economy is 
hit by a large supply shock, the central bank might find it optimal to set the inflation 
rate outside the target range. At that point there is no incentive for the monetary 
authorities to restrain themselves from giving in to political pressure. As a result, the 
inflation level and volatility outside the target range remain close to their levels under 
discretion. As is clear from figure 3, the optimal inflation contract does not suffer 
from this drawback since the slope of the marginal cost structure does not depend on 
how far inflation is from its optimal level.    
 
From the preceding discussion, it seems natural to design the optimal inflation band target in 
such a way that it approximates the marginal cost structure of the optimal inflation contract. 
The set-up presented in the previous section identifies two determinants of the shape of the 
marginal cost schedule.   
 
(i) Bandwidth  (BW): Figure 4(a) shows the effect that a change in the bandwidth has on 
the marginal cost schedule. An increase in the bandwidth flattens the marginal cost 
around the midpoint, while a decrease has the opposite effect. An increase in the 
                                                 
21 In Appendix B we show that under a quadratic distribution of the control error the marginal cost structure is 
indeed linear within the target range. 
22 As indicated in the previous footnote, the marginal cost is actually increasing within a small interval 
immediately outside the boundaries. However, when the bandwidth is reasonable large relative to the control 
error this interval becomes very small.   23




(ii) Accountability  (C ): Figure 4(b) shows how a change in the degree of accountability 
affects the marginal cost structure. An increase in the cost of missing the target range 
increases the marginal cost proportionally at any given inflation level. Hence, 
increasing the degree of accountability should make the monetary authorities less 
inclined to give into political pressure.  
 
5.2 Reaction Function of the Central Bank under Inflation Band Targeting  
 
To show how inflation band targeting affects equilibrium inflation and volatility we proceed 
by simulating the reaction function of the central bank. Figure 5 shows the central bank’s 
optimal inflation rate as a function of expected inflation. The solid and dashed lines represent 
the reaction function under inflation band targeting and pure discretion, respectively.  Again, 
the bandwidth is 1.2% and the degree of accountability is 3. The supply shock is assumed to 
be zero. The first thing to notice is that the central bank has a relatively more muted response 
to changes in expected inflation within the target range than under discretion. This is because 
the target range imposes an additional marginal cost of raising inflation above the midpoint. 
The public understands this and expects a lower inflation level than under discretion. The 
lower equilibrium level of inflation is represented by the intersection between the solid line 
and the dotted 45-degree line.  
  Figure 6 shows the central bank’s desired inflation rate as a function of the realized 
supply shock. The solid and dashed line represents the reaction function under inflation band 
targeting and pure discretion, respectively. In order to focus on the effect that the target range 
has on shock management we eliminate the inflation bias by setting the government’s 
unemployment target equal to the natural rate. The response of the monetary authorities to a 
given supply shock is clearly lower within the target range relative to pure discretion. Indeed, 
                                                 
23 Interestingly, if the bandwidth is smaller than one standard deviation of the control error i.e  Z BW σ < ,  then 
the slope of the marginal cost structure (close to the midpoint) is increasing when the bandwidth is widened. 
This is due to the increasing absolute value of the slope of the normal PDF that occurs within one std away from 
its mean.   24
the supply shock response within the range is approximately the same as under the optimal 
rule. However, if the supply shock is large such that the desired inflation rate is outside the 
range, then the response by the monetary authorities is similar to that under pure discretion. 
This means that inflation band targeting reduces inflation volatility within but less so outside 
the target range.  
 
5.3 Optimal Bandwidth and Accountability 
 
Figures 7(a)-(d) show the effect that the bandwidth has on welfare, equilibrium inflation and 
inflation/unemployment volatility, respectively. Figure 7(d) illustrates that a narrow 
bandwidth may result in high inflation volatility since the probability of missing the inflation 
target is great. On the other hand, a wide bandwidth does little to reduce volatility within the 
target range and hence can also generate high inflation volatility. Figure 7(b) and 7(d) 
therefore suggested that, given an initial narrow (wide) bandwidth, a widening of the 
bandwidth may indeed reduce (increase) inflation volatility and increase (decrease) 
unemployment volatility. Figure 7(c) depicts the relationship between the bandwidth and 
equilibrium inflation. A narrow bandwidth suggests a higher marginal cost, given the 
inflation level, and thus should reduce the inflation bias. However, if the bandwidth is too 
narrow the probability of missing the target range may be so high that the inflation bias is 
greater than under a wider bandwidth. This is because inflation outside the target range 
remains close to its level under discretion. Hence an increase in the probability of missing the 
target range causes a rise in inflation expectations and forces the monetary authorities to 
increase inflation on average in order to alleviate the downward pressure on real activity.
24 
Figure 7(c) also highlights that the inflation bias can never be fully eliminated with a 
symmetric inflation band target. As mentioned earlier, this is because the marginal cost due 
to the target range is zero at the social optimal level of inflation.
25 Figure 7(a) shows the 
resulting welfare level under various bandwidths. A too narrow bandwidth results in a high 
                                                 
24 Additionally when the bandwidth is below one standard deviation of the control error, any further reduction 
in the bandwidth decreases the slope of the marginal cost curve and hence causes inflation to rise. Also notice 
that the equilibrium inflation rate is outside the target range for bandwidths that are extremely narrow (see 
section 5.6.) 
25 If the midpoint is allowed to be lower than the social optimal level or the level of accountability at the upper 
boundary is higher than that of the lower boundary, then it is possible to eliminate the bias completely.   25
probability of missing the target range and will hence produce a high level and volatility of 
inflation. On the other hand, a too wide bandwidth, while decreasing the probability of 
missing the target range, does little to reduce the inflation level and volatility within the 
target range. Additionally, at the optimal level of the bandwidth (i.e., 1.2), the welfare level is 
not very sensitive to changes in the bandwidth. This suggests that the cost of deviating from 
the optimal bandwidth may not be very large. Indeed, this may be one reason why inflation 
band targeting is an attractive regime to implement in practice.  
Figures 8(a)-(d) show the effect that the degree of accountability has on welfare, 
equilibrium inflation and inflation/unemployment volatility, respectively. Not surprisingly, 
figures 8(c) and 8(d) show that increased accountability reduces both the inflation level and 
inflation volatility. Of course, a higher level of accountability also increases unemployment 
volatility. Consequently, as shown in figure 8(a), there exists a welfare maximizing level of 
accountability that trades off the reduction in the inflation bias and volatility against a higher 
level of unemployment volatility. In practice the level of accountability is probably the 
hardest parameter to specify optimally. However, if the overall welfare benefit of having 
monetary policy respond optimally to supply shocks is relatively small, then a too high level 
of accountability that reduces the inflation bias significantly, but over-stabilizes inflation, is 
less costly than a too low level of accountability which gives rise to a high inflation bias and 
under-stabilizes inflation. 
Table 1(a) shows the inflation level, inflation/unemployment volatility, and welfare 
under discretion and under the optimal rule/optimal contract for various values of δ and 
* u . 
The inflation level under discretion varies from 2% to 4.24% while the standard deviations of 
inflation and unemployment lie within the intervals of 0.92-1.14% and 0.57-0.67%, 
respectively. The optimal rule (and the equivalently optimal inflation contract) implies an 
inflation and unemployment volatility of approximately 0.75 and 0.81 standard deviations, 
respectively. Table 1(b) shows the inflation level, inflation/unemployment volatility, and 
welfare under the optimal inflation band targeting regime. It also shows the corresponding 
optimal values of the bandwidth and degree of accountability.  
From these simulations we can see that the inflation band targeting regime does very 
well in reducing both the inflation bias and the excess volatility. Of course, as mentioned in 
section 5.1, it cannot completely eliminate the welfare losses that arise under full discretion.   26
For example, the lowest welfare level under discretion is -3.31 ( 6 = δ and  3
* = u ). This is a 
welfare loss of 2.7 relative to the optimal rule/inflation contract. The optimal inflation band 
target increases the welfare level to -0.67 which is only 0.06 lower than the optimal 
rule/inflation contract. This corresponds to approximately a 98% reduction of the initial 
welfare loss.  
  Table 1(b) shows that the inflation volatility under the optimal inflation targeting 
regime is lower than under the optimal rule/inflation contract while the opposite is true for 
unemployment volatility. The reason is that the band target attempts to eliminate both the 
excess volatility and the inflation bias. However, at the point where the excess inflation 
volatility is eliminated, the marginal benefits from reducing the inflation bias is still greater 
than the marginal cost of over-stabilize inflation. Hence inflation (unemployment) volatility 
will be below (above) its optimal level. 
Table 1(b) also tells us how to design an optimal inflation band target under various 
values of δ and 
* u .The bandwidth only varies between 0.9 to 1.4 while the degree of 
accountability varies between 2.1 to 8.8. Furthermore, the optimal bandwidth does not seem 
to be affected much by the degree of the governments volatility bias, i.e., δ . Indeed, this 
distortion is most effectively reduced by a high degree of accountability since it reduces both 
the inflation bias and volatility. However, the simulations seem to suggest that a country 
where the government has a relatively low unemployment target (i.e., a low 
* u ) should have 
both a tighter band and a higher degree of accountability.  
Finally, in order to asses the likelihood of missing the target range, it may be 
convenient to express the optimal bandwidth in terms of standard deviation of inflation. The 
final matrix in table 1(b) shows that there is little variation in this measure across our set of 
simulation. Indeed, it varies between 1.39 and 1.89.  Assuming that the inflation rate is at the 
midpoint and that the inflation distribution is approximately normal, these numbers would 
indicate that the optimal inflation band targeting regime implies a 5-17% probability that the 
target range will be breached.
26 Intuitively this makes sense since the marginal cost structure 
                                                 
26 The distribution of inflation will not be normally distributed under inflation band targeting, but will have 
thicker tails because of the non-linear cost structure. However, the normal distribution is still likely to provide a 
good approximation.   27
is fairly close to that of the optimal inflation contract as long as realized inflation is not too 
far outside the target range. 
Indeed, these numbers for the optimal bandwidth are not out of line with what we see 
in countries that have adopted inflation band targets.  In a sample of fourteen countries in 
which there has been a stable operating framework for at least two years and where the 
country was not in the middle of an ongoing adjustment from high to low inflation, the 
average ratio of bandwidth to standard deviation is 1.7, well within the range of what our 
simulations find.
27   
 
5.4 Supply Shocks and Optimal Design 
 
Because of the quadratic form of the welfare function any theoretical solution which 
completely eliminates the welfare distortions has to be characterized by a linear marginal 
cost structure. This means that the level of supply shock volatility becomes irrelevant to the 
optimal design of the inflation contract. One interesting feature of the inflation band targeting 
set-up is that its optimal design is sensitive to the level of supply shock volatility. 
 Table 2, shows how the optimal design of inflation band targeting changes as the 
volatility of the supply shock increases. The basic intuition for changing the width of the 
inflation bands and the degree of accountability is that higher supply shock volatility makes it 
more likely that inflation will end up outside the target range. As the first two rows of table 2 
show, in this case it becomes optimal to increase both the bandwidth and the degree of 
accountability. The widening of the bandwidth makes it more likely that inflation will be 
contained within the boundaries of the target range. On the other hand, the inflation volatility 
within the target range increases. The increase in the degree accountability reduces this 
problem by making it increasingly costly to deviate from the socially optimal level of 
inflation i.e., the slope of the marginal cost structure within the target range increases. It is 
                                                 
27 The data was collected from the IFS and individual central banks. The fourteen countries included in the 
sample are Australia, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Israel, Iceland, Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, and U.K. Note however, the variation in this measure for individual countries is 
quite high, ranging from 0.4 to 3.9.   One problem with this calculation (because it is for individual countries 
over very short sample periods) is that the standard deviation of inflation for the particular sample period may 
not accurately reflect the unconditional standard deviation because the sample period is unusual.   28
also worth pointing out that the ability of the inflation band targeting regime to reduce 
welfare distortions is lower at higher levels of supply shock volatility. 
One potentially important implication of table 2 is that developing countries, which 
typically are characterized by greater supply shock volatility, should implement an inflation 
band targeting regime with a high degree of accountability and a wide target range. In 
addition, they will benefit less from an inflation band targeting regime relative to countries 
that are less prone to large supply shocks. 
 
5.5 Central Bank Independence as a Mean of Reducing Welfare Distortions  
 
As is clear from previous discussions, a reduction in the political influence over monetary 
policy (i.e., λ ) would reduce the welfare distortions under discretion. There are potentially 
many ways to achieve such a reduction. First, the obvious way to limit political influence is 
to increase central bank autonomy. Second, an increased degree of transparency and better 
communication with the public by the central bank could potentially prevent the government 
from using monetary policy for reelection purposes. Third, legislation such as the Maastricht 
treaty could clarify the goals of monetary policy and make it harder for the government to 
influence monetary policy outcomes.  Indeed, all these approaches to decrease λ  seem to be 
present in the inflation band targeting regimes that has been implemented in reality. Since 
different countries are likely to allow different degree of political influence, it would be 
instructive to examine how the optimal design would change as λ  changes.  
Table 3, displays the optimal degree of accountability and bandwidth, as well as 
welfare levels, for various levels of political influence. From our analysis of discretionary 
monetary policy, we know that the more influence the government has over monetary policy 
the higher is the equilibrium inflation level and volatility.   Thus, as table 3 indicates, just by 
reducing λ , there is a substantial improvement in welfare even without the use of inflation 
band targeting.  Therefore insulating the central bank from political influence through 
communication strategies, price stability mandates and legislated central bank independence 
are another important dimension of institutional design to improve monetary policy 
performance.     29
Since a higher degree of accountability reduces both the inflation level and volatility, 
it seems reasonable to expect that a country with a relatively less independent central bank 
should implement an inflation band framework with a relatively higher degree of 
accountability. Table 3 clearly shows that this implication holds.   The relationship between 
political influence and the optimal bandwidth, however, is less obvious.  Indeed, as we see in 
table 3, the optimal bandwidth does not seem to change much with changes in λ and does not 
have a monotonic relationship with λ .  
 
5.6 When does Inflation Band Targeting not help? 
 
Inflation band targeting does not always improve the discretionary outcome. It may be the 
case that the equilibrium inflation rate lies outside the target range. In fact, figure 9 shows the 
case where the reaction function of the central bank intersects the 45-degree line at the same 
point as under discretion. This situation is likely to arise if the initial inflation bias is large, 
the target range is very narrow, and the degree of accountability very low. Under these 
circumstances the marginal cost of giving in to political pressure is not high enough to make 
the framework credible. Rational agents realizing this will still expect an inflation rate 
identical to that under discretion. 
  The optimal bandwidth of the target range is easy to calculate, so unless the designers 
of the inflation band target are incompetent, it is unlikely that they would choose a target 
range that is too narrow.  However, there well may be limits on how high accountability can 
be set.  We have seen an example of this in Europe with the implementation of the Growth 
and Stability Pact in which countries are supposed to be fined if they exceed the deficit limit 
of 3% of GDP.   However, when countries have exceeded this deficit limit there has been a 
reluctance to fine them.  It is true that there still has been a cost for these countries when they 
exceed the deficit limit, but it does illustrate that accountability may be limited because if a 
punishment is felt to be too draconian, it will not be imposed.  This has an important 
implication.  In order to avoid needing a level of accountability (C) that is unenforceable, the 
inflation bias needs to be kept low and this requires that the amount of political influence 
over the central bank (λ  )needs to be limited.  This analysis thus provides another reason   30
why the measures to promote central bank autonomy mentioned in the previous section are 
important elements of a well-designed inflation targeting regime. 
  It is also possible that the there exists multiple equilibria. Figure 9(b) shows the same 
cases as in 9(a) but with a higher degree of accountability. The reaction function crosses the 
45-degree line three times. The first equilibrium occurs within the target range but very close 
to the upper boundary. The second equilibrium occurs outside the target range but at a lower 
inflation level than the original inflation level under discretion. However, this equilibrium is 
not stable. If inflation expectations falls below the second equilibrium inflation will converge 
towards the equilibrium inside the target range. On the other hand, if for some reason 
expected inflation falls above the second equilibrium then inflation will converge to the 
initial inflation level under discretion. 
  Figure 9(c) shows how the framework in 9(a) and (b) can be made stable by 
increasing the degree of accountability further. The equilibrium inflation is well inside the 




In this paper we have examined how target ranges work in the context of a Barro-
Gordon (1983) type model, but which has a more realistic setting in that the time-
inconsistency problem stems not from the preferences of the central bank, as in Barro-
Gordon, but instead from political pressures from the government.  In contrast to conjectures 
in the literature that are skeptical about the benefits of inflation target ranges, we find that 
target ranges turn out to be an excellent way to cope with the time-inconsistency problem and 
provide incentives that get monetary policy to be very close to optimal policy in which the 
time-inconsistency problem is avoided altogether.   
Our theoretical model also shows how an inflation targeting range should be set and 
how it should respond to changes in the nature of shocks to the economy.  We find that 
inflation band targeting has a marginal cost structure that is very close to that of the optimal 
inflation contract as long as realized inflation is not too far outside the target range.  This tells 
us that the target range has to be wide enough so that realized inflation ends up inside it most 
of the time, and this also tells us that the more uncertainty there is about the inflation process,   31
the wider the target range has to be.  Indeed, this is what we actually find in practice, where 
emerging market countries, which are more likely to have more uncertainty about inflation 
outcomes, tend to choose wider target ranges. 
The theoretical framework here thus shows how inflation band targeting has desirable 
characteristics and why central banks who target inflation have adopted target ranges as part 
of their monetary policy framework. 
   32
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Appendix A:  Analysis of Appointment of a Conservative Central Banker 
 
One of the most prominent remedies that the literature has put forth in order to reduce the 
welfare distortions that arise under discretion is to appointment of a conservative banker. 
There are two ways in which a central banker can be conservative:  (1) he can be weight-
conservative, that is put a higher weight on inflation volatility than is socially optimal, (2) he 
can be target-conservative, that is have an inflation target below the social optimum. 
 
Weight-Conservative Central Banker 
 
The approach of the weight-conservative central banker was first suggested by Rogoff 
(1985). In his model, as in most of the literature on the inflation bias problem, he assumes 
that the monetary authorities are targeting a “too low” unemployment rate. In equilibrium, 
under rational expectations, the low unemployment target then leads to an inflation bias. 
Rogoff shows that by appointing a weight-conservative central banker the inflation bias can 
be reduced, but only at the expense of higher unemployment volatility. Since there is no 
initial excess inflation volatility in Rogoff’s model, the increased unemployment volatility is 
welfare reducing.
28  
A common criticism of this general framework is that central bankers are technocrats 
and do not have an inherent desire to push unemployment below its natural rate (see Blinder 
(1997)). Our model, however, is not subject to this criticism since we assume that the central 
bank is targeting the right level of unemployment. It is the government that has an overly 
optimistic unemployment target. Hence, it is only through the assumption of incomplete 
independence that the inflation bias arises. This distinction turns out to be important when 
analyzing the effects of the appointing a weight-conservative central banker. 
Let us start by specifying the preferences of the weight conservative central banker as 
follows:  
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28 Of course, when there is an initial excess inflation volatility (i.e., too low unemployment volatility), the 













t U U U λ λ − + = 1 . 
 
Solving the modified maximization problem facing the monetary authorities, we can derive 
the new reaction function as: 
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From equation (A2) it is clear that 
C
u ω  only enters into the third term and will not impact the 
source of the inflation bias. Hence, a weight-conservative central banker reduces the inflation 
volatility, but it does not affect the inflation bias.   
This result is different from Rogoff (1985) who finds that a weight-conservative 
banker is able to reduce the inflation bias.   The reason for our result being different is that 
the government, not the central bank, advocates the low unemployment target. Hence, the 
political pressure to systematically exploit the short-run Phillips curve in order to push 
unemployment below its natural rate remains and so appointing a weight-conservative central 
banker does not reduce the inflation bias. We believe that our result is intuitively more 
sensible than Rogoff’s.  Ironically, since there is an initial excess inflation volatility in our 
model, the reduction in inflation volatility is welfare improving and not welfare reducing as it 
is in Rogoff’s set-up.  
Comparing equation (A2) to the optimal reaction function under discretion (16), we 
can derive the preferences of the optimal central banker (i.e., the weight, 
C
u ω , which 
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From equation (A3) we can also see that there is a limit to how low the weight can be. That 
is, depending on δ  and the degree of political oversight, λ , it might not be feasible to 
eliminate all the excess inflation volatility. 
  
Target-Conservative Central Banker 
 
Svensson (1997) shows that by appointing a central banker with an inflation target lower than 
the socially optimal level, the inflation bias can easily be eliminated. However, he also 
emphasizes that the target-conservative central banker does not affect the excess inflation 
volatility arising under discretion. . Unlike Svensson’s model, where the source of the 
inflation bias is internal to the central bank (i.e., it is the central bank that has a “too low” 
unemployment target), in our set-up the inflation bias stems entirely from political influence 
over monetary policy. 
   To see the implication of this difference we denote the new inflation target by 
T π , 
and express the central bank’s new objective function as: 
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where,  












t U  remaining equal to (9).  Solving the modified maximization problem facing the 
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From equation (A6), it is clear that 
T π does not affect the stabilization objective of the 
monetary authorities. Hence, the target-conservative central banker can only reduced the 
inflation bias not the excess inflation volatility. Comparing  (A6) to the optimal reaction 
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That is, the central bank’s optimal inflation target is lower than the socially optimal inflation 
rate, i.e., 
T π  < 
* π .  Similarly, Svensson (1997) derives the optimal inflation target to equal 
the social optimal level of inflation less the initial inflation bias. A potentially important 
difference between the optimal inflation target derived by Svensson (1997) and equation 
(A7) is that the differential between the target and the social optimal level is, in our case, 
greater than the initial inflation bias. This stems from the separation of the preferences of the 
monetary authorities and the government. In our set up the monetary authorities have to be 
even more conservative in order to compensate for the lack of commitment by the 
government to the new inflation target.    
 
Combining the Weight-Conservative and Target-Conservative Central Banker 
 
When a weight-conservative central banker also is target-conservative, then it is possible to 
eliminate both welfare distortions existing under discretion.  Under this scenario the new 
reaction function of the central bank equals: 
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Inserting equation (A1) and (A7) into the expression above we get the optimal reaction 
function under discretion described in equation (16). Hence, the low inflation target and the   39
low weight on unemployment volatility ensure that equilibrium inflation level and volatility 
are equal to their respective social optimal level.  
To see that the optimal weight-conservative and target-conservative central banker is 
equivalent to the optimal inflation contract discussed in the text, we can simply rewrite α  
and β  as  
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where 
T π and 
C
u ω are defined by equation (A3) and (A7). 
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